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 OPINION 
                
COWEN, Circuit Judge: 
 Plaintiffs in these related cases, former employees and 
managers of Meritor Savings Bank, appeal from three orders of the 
district court that granted summary judgment in favor of the 
defendant, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), on 
their claims to recover severance pay, medical benefits, and life 
insurance benefits pursuant to the terms of their employee 
welfare benefit plans.  The issues raised in these appeals are 
whether the district court erred in determining that: (1) the 
FDIC's takeover and sale of Meritor was not a reorganization for 
purposes of the plaintiffs' separation pay plan; (2) the 
discharge of Meritor employees did not constitute "job 
elimination" or "lack of work" triggering severance payments; (3) 
the plaintiffs had no vested right to severance pay; (4) the FDIC 
properly exercised its repudiation powers; (5) the plaintiffs did 
not incur "actual direct compensatory damages" as provided in 12 
U.S.C. § 1821(e)(3); (6) the FDIC properly terminated life and 
health insurance benefits pursuant to the termination provisions 
in these employee welfare benefit plans; (7) the FDIC was not 
liable for a statutory penalty under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1) as a 
result of its failure to respond in a timely manner to 
  
plaintiffs' request for plan documents; and (8) the certification 
of three plaintiff classes was inappropriate.  Because we 
conclude that the district court did not err in granting summary 
judgment to the FDIC on plaintiffs' claims for separation pay, 
health insurance benefits, and life insurance benefits, we will 
affirm the orders of the district court.  Further, because we 
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
finding that the FDIC is not liable for the statutory penalty 
prescribed by 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c), we will affirm the order of 
the district court pertaining to this issue.  Finally, because of 
our conclusion on the merits, that the district court did not err 
in granting summary judgment for the FDIC, we need not reach the 
class certification issues. 
 
 I.  FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 On December 11, 1992, the Secretary of Banking of the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania issued an order declaring Meritor 
Savings Bank ("Meritor") insolvent and directing that the bank be 
closed.  On the same day, the FDIC was appointed as receiver for 
the insolvent bank.  As receiver, the FDIC executed a Purchase 
and Assumption Agreement with Mellon Bank ("Mellon") transferring 
a portion of Meritor's assets and liabilities to Mellon.  The 
FDIC retained the liabilities not assumed by Mellon, along with 
the unpurchased Meritor assets, which the FDIC proceeded to 
liquidate for the benefit of Meritor's approved creditors. 
 The record demonstrates that until the Secretary of Banking 
declared the bank insolvent, Meritor maintained a separation pay 
  
plan ("SPP"), a retiree health insurance plan (the Meritor 
Medical Plan 65 Special Option or "65 Special"), and a retiree 
life insurance plan (the Meritor Group Life Insurance Plan or 
"MGLIP").1  Under the SPP, eligible employees were entitled to 
severance pay based on their years of service and salary, up to a 
maximum benefit of twenty-six weeks.  Benefits were payable for 
involuntary termination due to "lack of work, job elimination, 
reorganization or reduction-in-force."  Campbell App. at 139a.  
No benefits would be paid if separation resulted from sale or 
disposition of a portion of Meritor's assets and the employee was 
employed by the successor entity.  Id. 
 The SPP was "unfunded," meaning all benefits were paid from 
the general assets of Meritor.  Id. at 141a.  Meritor retained 
sole authority to determine whether a separation entitled an 
employee to benefits.  Id.  Moreover, Meritor expressly reserved 
the right to modify or discontinue the SPP in whole or in part at 
any time.  Id. at 137a. 
 Under the 65 Special, Meritor provided group health 
insurance coverage for its retirees.  Id. at 406a.  The 65 
Special was a self-insured plan that qualified as an employee 
welfare benefit plan under the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 
                     
1
.  The parties stipulated to the material facts in these cases.  
Statement of Undisputed Facts, Hennessy App. at 187-95; Joint 
Statement of Undisputed and Disputed Facts Regarding Motions for 
Summary Judgment, Campbell App. at 403a-70a; Joint Statement and 
Joint Supplemental Statement of Disputed and Undisputed Facts, 
Adolph App. at 367a-437a. 
  
("ERISA").  The MGLIP, also an employee welfare benefit plan 
under ERISA, provided retirees with death benefit coverage equal 
to the lesser of $50,000 or 25% of the amount of death benefit 
coverage for which they were insured immediately prior to 
retirement.  Id. at 405a-06a.  
 Meritor explicitly reserved the right to terminate the 65 
Special and the MGLIP at any time.  The health plan provided: 
 Meritor intends the plan to be permanent, but since future 
conditions affecting your employer cannot be anticipated or 
foreseen, Meritor reserves the right to amend, modify or 
terminate the plan at any time, which may result in the 
termination or modification of your coverage.  Expenses 
incurred prior to the plan termination will be paid as 
provided under the terms of the plan prior to its 
termination. 
 




 Meritor reserves the right to terminate the group life 
insurance policy for its employees and retirees at any time, 
if Meritor determines that such termination is in its best 
interests.  If Meritor terminates its group life insurance 
policy, employees and retirees who die after the effective 
date of the termination . . . will not have any life 
insurance. 
Id. at 152a. 
 On the day the Secretary declared Meritor insolvent, a 
meeting was held to discuss the status of Meritor's employees.  
At that meeting, Jack Goodner, the FDIC's closing manager, made a 
brief presentation.  When he finished his remarks, an employee 
asked him whether severance benefits would be paid.  Goodner 
thought not, but was not sure.  After looking towards two other 
FDIC officials for guidance, Goodner responded "no."  At the 
  
close of business on December 11, 1992, the former Meritor 
employees became employees of Keytech Resources, Inc., a firm 
established to provide staffing for the former Meritor offices 
purchased by Mellon.  Mellon paid severance benefits to the 
employees who were subsequently laid off based on their years of 
service to Meritor, up to a maximum of four weeks salary. 
 On the Monday following the events of Friday, December 11, 
1992, the former branches of Meritor opened for business as usual 
under the name of Mellon-PSFS without interruption of business to 
regular customers.  The FDIC subsequently repudiated the SPP 
pursuant to its powers under 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e).  The FDIC did 
not repudiate either the 65 Special or the MGLIP plans.  Instead, 
the FDIC sent letters to the former employees and retirees of 
Meritor notifying them that their health and life insurance plans 
were terminated effective December 31, 1992 pursuant to the terms 
of each plan.2  Those letters advised the employees about the 
availability of FDIC-sponsored continuing medical coverage, and 
also provided specific instructions for filing claims for 
benefits under the FDIC's statutory claims process, alerting the 
employees and retirees to a March 19, 1993 bar date for filing 
claims against the assets of the receivership. 
 
 A. The Hennessy Plaintiffs 
                     
2
.  Consistent with the above facts, when we use the term 
"repudiation," we are referring to the statutory power of a 
receiver under 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e) to refuse to recognize a 
contract.  "Termination," by contrast, refers to the 
discontinuing of a plan pursuant to the plan's own terms. 
  
 The Hennessy plaintiffs are former managers of Meritor.  
They filed suit in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania alleging 
the right to recover severance pay pursuant to the terms of the 
SPP.  In support of their claim, they rely on the above-stated 
facts and the fact that, prior to the FDIC's takeover of Meritor, 
each of them received a letter from Meritor's Chairman, Roger 
Hillas, stating: 
 
  Meritor senior management is acutely aware that [it] is 
essential to retain motivated employees such as you in key 
positions. 
 
  As evidence of this awareness, Meritor is extending the 
severance benefit provided to you under the Separation Pay 
Program to a total of 52 weeks pay.  This enhanced benefit 
will be payable under the same terms and conditions as 
provided for in the Separation Pay Program if you are 
separated from employment by Meritor anytime on or before 
December 31, 1992. 
Letter from Hillas to John Hennessy (October 3, 1990); Hennessy 
App. at 68.  The Hennessy plaintiffs argued before the district 
court that their severance rights under the SPP were activated 
when "they were terminated as part of a reorganization."  
Hennessy v. FDIC, 858 F. Supp. 483, 487 (E.D. Pa. 1994). 
 The district court rejected the Hennessy plaintiffs' 
argument.  The court explained that the FDIC sold Meritor to 
Mellon and was in the process of liquidating the rest of 
Meritor's assets.  Id.  The court reasoned that because the FDIC 
was involved with the termination of Meritor, rather than the 
continuation of its business, there was no reorganization.  Id.  
 In the alternative, the Hennessy plaintiffs argued before 
the district court that given the FDIC's repudiation of the SPP, 
  
the plaintiffs should be able to recover severance pay pursuant 
to 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(3) which provides for compensation for 
actual direct compensatory damages attributable to a repudiation.  
Id. at 488-89.  The district court disagreed.  Relying on the 
decision of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Howell 
v. FDIC, 986 F.2d 569 (1st Cir. 1993), the district court 
determined that severance payments are not actual direct 
compensatory damages under § 1821(e)(3).  Id. at 489.  
Accordingly, the district court granted summary judgment in favor 
of the FDIC.  Id. at 485.  This appeal followed.     
 
 B. The Campbell Plaintiffs 
 The Campbell plaintiffs include: (1) David Campbell, Jr., an 
employee who retired from Meritor effective December 1, 1987; (2) 
Robert Hanna, Helen DeMarco, and Leslie Voth, employees who were 
employed by Meritor on December 11, 1992; and (3) potential 
plaintiff classes comprised of the above named plaintiffs and 
those similarly situated.  The Campbell plaintiffs filed claims 
for benefits with the FDIC.  The FDIC, however, rejected these 
claims. 
 Subsequent to the FDIC's denial of their claims, the 
Campbell plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  In their 
complaint, plaintiffs Hanna and DeMarco sought severance payment 
pursuant to the SPP.  Plaintiff Campbell sought a declaration 
that he and other similarly situated persons are entitled to 
health insurance coverage under the 65 Special.  Campbell also 
  
sought reimbursement with interest for health insurance premiums 
paid since December 11, 1992.  In addition to these claims, 
plaintiffs Campbell and Hanna sought a declaration that they and 
other similarly situated persons are entitled to life insurance 
under the MGLIP.  They also sought reimbursement with interest 
for life insurance premiums paid since December 11, 1992.  
Finally, plaintiffs Campbell, Hanna, Voth and DeMarco sought a 
monetary penalty under ERISA for the FDIC's failure to provide in 
a timely manner information requested by their counsel.3 
 The district court denied Hanna and DeMarco's claims for 
severance pay under the SPP for the reasons set forth in its 
decision in Hennessy.  Campbell v. FDIC, No. CIV.A.93-3969, 1994 
WL 475067, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 1994).  In addition, the 
court found that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the claims 
brought by Campbell or Voth because these claims were filed 
prematurely.4  Id.  Nevertheless, the court concluded that even 
if it had jurisdiction to hear Campbell's claims for health and 
life insurance benefits, these claims would fail because the FDIC 
terminated both the 65 Special and the MGLIP pursuant to its 
                     
3
.  Plaintiffs' counsel sent an ERISA document request to the 
FDIC on March 16, 1993.  The FDIC did not respond to the ERISA 
document request until September 21, 1993, 189 days after the 
initial request. 
4
.  The court concluded that Campbell's and Voth's claims were 
premature because these plaintiffs did not wait the requisite 180 
days after filing their claims with the FDIC before filing their 
actions in district court.  Campbell, 1994 WL 475067, at *4.  The 
court noted, however, that Campbell and Voth were added as 
individual plaintiffs in the Adolph case by the filing of the 
First Amended Complaint in that case and thus these plaintiffs 
asserted a timely filing in Adolph.  Id. at *7 n.7.      
  
contractual rights.  Id.  Finally, the district court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the FDIC on the plaintiffs' claims 
for a statutory penalty because it concluded that: (1) the 
statutory penalty should not apply to the FDIC, an agency of the 
federal government; or (2) even if the statutory requirement does 
apply to the FDIC, the court would exercise its discretion under 
29 U.S.C. § 1132(c) and award no penalty in this case.  Id. at 
*7. 
 With respect to the potential class claims, the district 
court denied plaintiffs' motion to certify a separation pay plan 
class, a retiree health class, and a life insurance class.  
Campbell v. FDIC, No. 93-3969 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 1994) (order 
denying class certification).  The court determined that the 
plaintiffs could not satisfy all four of the threshold 
requirements of Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure for certifying a plaintiff class.  Id. at 5, 7, 8.  In 
addition, the district court found that class certification under 
Rule 23(b)(1) or Rule 23(b)(2) would be inappropriate.  Id. at 9.  
This appeal followed. 
 
 C.  The Adolph Plaintiffs 
 The Adolph plaintiffs are a group of 161 former Meritor 
employees and retirees.5  In their complaint, also filed in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
                     
5
.  On July 22, 1994 the district court entered an order granting 
the plaintiffs' unopposed motion to amend the complaint in this 
matter to add David Campbell and Leslie Voth as plaintiffs. 
  
Pennsylvania, the employee plaintiffs challenged the repudiation 
of the SPP by the FDIC.  The retiree plaintiffs challenged the 
termination of their medical benefits under the 65 Special.  In 
addition, both the employee and retiree plaintiffs challenged the 
termination of the MGLIP.  The FDIC and the Adolph plaintiffs 
filed motions for summary judgment on July 26, 1994.  The 
district court granted summary judgment for the FDIC for the 
reasons detailed in Hennessy and Campbell.  Adolph v. FDIC, No. 
94-1499 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 1994) (order granting summary 
judgment).  This appeal followed. 
 
 II. JURISDICTION 
 These cases commenced under the Financial Institutions 
Reform, Recovery and Relief Act of 1989 ("FIRREA") and ERISA.  
The district court's jurisdiction was predicated upon 28 U.S.C. § 
1331.  We have jurisdiction over the instant appeals pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over a grant of 
summary judgment.  Because the material facts in this matter are 
not in dispute, we review only for errors of law.  As to the 
Campbell plaintiffs' argument that an ERISA penalty should be 
assessed pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1), our review is for 
abuse of discretion. 
 
 III. SEVERANCE PAY 
 A. Was there a Reorganization? 
 The Hennessy plaintiffs' first contention is that Meritor 
was "reorganized," triggering a right to severance payments under 
  
the terms of the SPP.  According to these plaintiffs, Mellon Bank 
acquired Meritor as a going concern following the FDIC's takeover 
of Meritor.  The Hennessy plaintiffs point out that Meritor's 
offices opened for business as usual on the next business day 
after the takeover under the trademark "Mellon-PSFS."  They 
assert that because Meritor continued as a going concern without 
interruption of business, they have a right to severance payments 
under the terms of the SPP. 
 We are unpersuaded by this argument.  The written terms of 
the SPP provide that: 
 
 If the Employee is involuntarily terminated for 
organizational reasons associated with lack of work, job 
elimination, reorganization, or reduction in force . . . 
he/she will be eligible to receive bi-weekly separation 
payments and benefit continuation as outlined in Section IV 
of the Plan Document. 
Meritor Separation Pay Program (effective November 1, 1989); 
Campbell App. at 129a (emphasis added).  The district court 
determined that both the facts and the law in this case did not 
support the conclusion that the Hennessy plaintiffs were 
terminated as part of a reorganization.  Hennessy, 858 F. Supp. 
at 487.  It reasoned that the FDIC's takeover and sale of a 
bank's assets constituted a termination of the bank's business, 
not a continuation of this business.  Id.  We agree with the 
determination of the district court. 
 A receiver, unlike a conservator, does not have as its 
purpose the preservation of an institution as a going concern.  
Resolution Trust Corp. v. CedarMinn Bldg. Ltd. Partnership, 956 
  
F.2d 1446, 1454 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,     U.S.    , 113 S. 
Ct. 94 (1992).  Receivers have the power to liquidate and wind up 
the affairs of an institution.  Id. (citing FDIC v. Grella, 553 
F.2d 258, 261 (2d Cir. 1977)).  As the Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit has recognized, this distinction was emphasized in 
the Conference Report accompanying FIRREA, which stated: 
 
 The title . . . distinguishes between the powers of a 
conservator and receiver, making clear that a conservator 
operates or disposes of an institution as a going concern 
while a receiver has the power to liquidate and wind up the 
affairs of an institution. 
Id. (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 209, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 398 
(1989)). 
 The Secretary of Banking for the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania closed Meritor Savings Bank.  The FDIC was appointed 
receiver and it sold some of Meritor's assets to Mellon.  As part 
of this transaction, Mellon agreed to assume some of Meritor's 
liabilities.  The FDIC proceeded to liquidate the remaining 
assets of Meritor for the benefit of Meritor's creditors.  These 
actions are commensurate with the winding up of a failed bank's 
affairs and the proper function of a receiver.  To suggest that 
these actions constituted a reorganization of Meritor is to turn 
a blind eye to the dispositive facts.  We therefore cannot 
conclude that the district court erred in its determination that 
Meritor did not undergo a reorganization that would trigger 
plaintiffs' rights to severance pay. 
 
 B. "Job Elimination" or "Lack of Work" 
  
 Rather than arguing that Meritor was reorganized, the Adolph 
and Campbell plaintiffs suggest that under the terms of the SPP, 
"job elimination" or "lack of work" triggered the receiver's 
obligation to pay severance benefits.  According to these 
plaintiffs, the district court failed to adequately consider this 
argument when it simply relied on its discussion in Hennessy to 
grant summary judgment in favor of the FDIC in the Campbell and 
Adolph cases.6  The Adolph and Campbell plaintiffs assert that 
because the FDIC, as receiver, stands in the shoes of Meritor, it 
must provide separation benefits pursuant to the written terms of 
the SPP. 
 This argument also misses the mark.  As stated above, the 
written terms of the SPP provide: 
 
 IF the Employee is involuntarily terminated for 
organizational reasons associated with lack of work, job 
elimination, reorganization, or reduction in force . . . 
he/she will be eligible to receive bi-weekly separation 
payments and benefit continuation as outlined in Section IV 
of the Plan Document. 
Meritor Separation Pay Program (effective November 1, 1989); 
Campbell App. 129a (emphasis added).  Job elimination, however, 
is defined by the plan to be if "as a result of a reorganization, 
changing business needs, or the sale, closure or relocation of an 
office, a specific position is determined to be unnecessary to 
the company for an indefinite period of time."  Id. at 128a.  The 
Secretary of Banking's shutdown of Meritor and the appointment of 
                     
6
.  The district court's discussion in Hennessy did not 
specifically address this argument. 
  
the FDIC as receiver was not "reorganization, changing business 
needs, or the sale, closure or relocation of an office."  It was 
the shutdown of the entire bank.  Further, no specific position 
was "determined to be unnecessary to the company for an 
indefinite period of time."  Rather, Meritor ceased to exist, and 
the employment of all employees (not specific positions) was 
terminated permanently.  We therefore cannot conclude that "job 
elimination" triggered a right to severance pay. 
 Similarly, we cannot conclude that a "lack of work," as 
defined by the plan, triggered the right to severance benefits.  
Lack of work is defined by the plan to be if "as a result of a 
decrease in volume of work to be done, a position is temporarily 
not needed."  Id. at 128a (emphasis added).  The facts of this 
case do not support the view that a position was "temporarily not 
needed."  The Secretary of Banking closed the entire bank and 
declared Meritor insolvent.  We therefore fail to see how the 
Campbell and Adolph plaintiffs have demonstrated a "lack of work" 
as the plan defines that phrase.  Accordingly, we are unpersuaded 
that the district court erred in failing to find this argument a 
sufficient basis upon which to ground a claim for severance 
benefits.7 
                     
7
.  The Hennessy plaintiffs did not rely on "job elimination" or 
"lack of work" as a basis for recovery in their briefs before 
this Court.  At oral argument, however, counsel for the Hennessy 
plaintiffs stated that she believed that "job elimination" or 
"lack of work" would be an alternative grounds of recovery for 
her clients.  Further, she stated that the plan document 
containing the definitions of "job elimination" and "lack of 
work" received by the Campbell and Adolph plaintiffs was not 





 C. Did plaintiffs' right to severance pay vest? 
 Using slightly different approaches, the Hennessy 
plaintiffs, and the Campbell and Adolph plaintiffs, next argue 
that their rights to severance pay were "fixed and unconditional" 
when the receiver was appointed.  Based on certain language in 
the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit's opinion in Kennedy 
v. Boston-Continental National Bank, 84 F.2d 592 (1st Cir. 1936), 
the Hennessy plaintiffs argue that their rights to severance 
benefits vested on the day that Meritor closed its doors and went 
into receivership.  The Campbell and Adolph plaintiffs, by 
contrast, assert that the Meritor employees had fixed, 
enforceable contract rights to severance pay throughout the term 
of their employment as the result of their total compensation 
package.  According to the Campbell and Adolph plaintiffs, the 
only contingent aspect of their right to severance pay was the 
amount of the benefits to be paid, an amount that was tied to 
each employee's salary and years of service.  These plaintiffs 
cite Citizens State Bank of Lometa v. FDIC., 946 F.2d 408, 415 
(5th Cir. 1991), and that case's analysis of a standby letter of 
credit, to support their argument. 
(..continued) 
 While the Hennessy plaintiffs' argument along these lines 
raises certain questions about which plan documents are 
applicable to them, we need not decide these questions because of 
our determination, see infra part III.D., that the FDIC 
repudiated the SPP.   
  
 We find these arguments unconvincing.  The rights and 
liabilities of a bank and the bank's debtors and creditors are 
fixed as of the date of the declaration of a bank's insolvency.  
American Nat'l Bank of Jacksonville v. FDIC, 710 F.2d 1528, 1540 
(11th Cir. 1983) (citing First Empire Bank v. FDIC, 572 F.2d 
1361, 1367-68 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 919, 99 S. Ct. 
293 (1978); FDIC v. Grella, 553 F.2d 258, 262 (2d Cir. 1977); 
Kennedy, 84 F.2d at 597).  To establish a claim against an 
insolvent bank in receivership, the liability of the bank must 
have accrued and become unconditionally fixed on or before the 
time it is declared insolvent.  Kennedy, 84 F.2d at 597 
(citations omitted).  As the Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit has stated: 
 The amount of a claim may be later established, but it 
must be the amount due and owing at the time of the 
declaration of insolvency . . . .  If nothing is due at 
the time of insolvency, the claim should not be allowed 
. . . . 
Id.; see also Dababneh v. FDIC, 971 F.2d 428, 434 (10th Cir. 
1992) (courts analyze "provability" of claims and creditors 
possess "provable" claims only if claims are "in existence before 
insolvency") (quoting FDIC v. Liberty Nat'l Bank, 806 F.2d 961, 
965 (10th Cir. 1986)). 
 The language that the Hennessy plaintiffs cite in Kennedy is 
not to the contrary.  To support their argument, the Hennessy 
plaintiffs point to language in Kennedy that states: 
 
 Had the lease contained a covenant that insolvency shall be 
breach of the lease and thereupon, without any further 
action by the lessor, the lease shall terminate and the 
lessor shall be entitled forthwith to damages measured as 
  
provided in the covenant of the lease for liquidated 
damages, then, on the declaration of insolvency, no doubt a 
claim would arise and be matured by the agreement for 
liquidated damages . . . so that the claim would be provable 
in bankruptcy. 
Kennedy, 84 F.2d at 597 (citations omitted).  Aside from the fact 
that the Hennessy plaintiffs' position ignores the holding of 
Kennedy -- that the claim for failure to rent in that case was 
too contingent and uncertain to support liability -- these 
plaintiffs have made no showing that insolvency itself triggered 
their rights under the SPP.  The terms of the SPP do not provide 
that a declaration of insolvency triggers payment of severance 
benefits.  Accordingly, their right to severance benefits was 
still contingent at the time of the appointment of the receiver. 
 The Campbell and Adolph plaintiffs' right to severance pay 
was likewise contingent, and their reliance on Citizens State 
Bank of Lometa is unavailing.  In Lometa, the Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit held that claims that "originated" from 
standby letters of credit issued before the bank became insolvent 
passed the "provability test" even though the triggering event 
obligating the bank to pay did not occur until after the bank 
became insolvent.  Lometa, 946 F.2d at 415.  The court in Lometa, 
however, explained that standby letters of credit are not 
contingent liabilities; they are loans.  Id. at 414.  Therefore, 
such letters are not directly comparable to a severance pay plan 
under which no vested benefits accrue until a contingency is 
fulfilled.  Accordingly, we remain unconvinced that the 
  
plaintiffs had a vested right to benefits prior to, or at the 
time of, the appointment of the receiver. 
 
 D. Repudiation 
 Having determined that there was no event that triggered the 
payment of severance benefits, it would ordinarily be unnecessary 
to dispose of the other issues raised by the parties regarding 
their entitlement to severance pay, i.e., repudiation and whether 
the failure to pay severance benefits constituted actual direct 
compensatory damages under FIRREA.  However, the parties have 
forcefully argued their positions regarding the various 
"triggering" provisions, and have at least implied that they are 
susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.  We would 
normally commit the task of construing ambiguous contract terms 
to the fact finder after extrinsic evidence has been adduced.  We 
do not do so here because even if we were to assume a triggering 
event had occurred, we would nonetheless affirm the district 
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the FDIC because 
the FDIC repudiated the SPP pursuant to its statutory authority 
under 12 U.S.C. § 1821.  See PACC v. Rizzo, 502 F.2d 306, 308 n.1 
(3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1108, 95 S. Ct. 780 (1975) 
(we can affirm the district court on any ground). 
 The Hennessy, Campbell, and Adolph plaintiffs all allege 
that following the FDIC's appointment as receiver, the FDIC did 
not properly repudiate the SPP pursuant to the statutory 
requirements found at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(1).  According to the 
plaintiffs, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(1) requires the FDIC to make 
  
formal findings that the terms of the SPP were "burdensome" and 
that repudiation is necessary in order to "promote the orderly 
administration of the institution's affairs."  The plaintiffs 
argue that the FDIC made no such formal findings in this case and 
therefore any repudiation of the SPP was ineffective.  Further, 
the Hennessy plaintiffs argue that the FDIC improperly relied on 
an undisclosed policy of denying all claims for severance 
benefits in repudiating the SPP.8 
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.  In addition to this procedural argument, the Hennessy 
plaintiffs suggest that the FDIC's repudiation power is limited 
to executory contracts.  These plaintiffs cite LaMagna v. FDIC, 
828 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1993) in support of their position. 
 In LaMagna, the district court determined that an employment 
agreement which provided for severance pay was nonexecutory once 
the employee had rendered his services by working for one year.  
Id. at 2-3.  The court concluded that such nonexecutory contracts 
may not be repudiated by the FDIC pursuant to FIRREA.  Id. 
 We are unpersuaded by the district court's reasoning in 
LaMagna.  The district court's conclusory holding that § 1821(e) 
does not permit the receiver to repudiate a "nonexecutory" 
contract lacks support in both the statutory language and the 
case law.  As many courts have noted, the statute explicitly 
provides that a conservator or receiver "may disaffirm any 
contract or lease," not just executory contracts.  E.g., 
Employees' Retirement System of Alabama v. Resolution Trust 
Corp., 840 F. Supp. 972, 984 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (quoting § 
1821(e)(1)(A)) (emphasis in original).  This provision is in 
sharp contrast to the Bankruptcy Code which specifically refers 
only to the trustee's power to reject executory contracts.  See 
Morton v. Arlington Heights Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 836 F. Supp. 
477, 481-82 (N.D. Ill. 1993); Employees' Retirement System of 
Alabama, 840 F. Supp. at 984 (noting marked contrast with the 
Bankruptcy Code which gives a trustee in bankruptcy the power to 
"assume or reject any executory contract." (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 
365(a))).  Because Congress provided no such limitation here, we 
are unable to conclude that the FDIC's power of repudiation is 
limited only to executory contracts. 
  
 The provisions governing a receiver's authority to repudiate 
contracts can be found at 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e).  Section 1821(e) 
states, in pertinent part: 
 
 (1) Authority to repudiate contracts 
 
  In addition to any other rights a conservator or 
receiver may have, the conservator or receiver for any 
insured depository institution may disaffirm or repudiate 
any contract or lease-- 
 
  (A) to which the institution is a party; 
  (B) the performance of which the conservator or 
receiver, in the conservator's or receiver's 
discretion, determines to be burdensome; and 
  (C) the disaffirmance or repudiation of which the 
conservator or receiver determines, in the 
conservator's or receiver's discretion, will promote 
the orderly administration of the institution's 
affairs. 
 
12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(1) (Supp. V 1993).  Section 1821(e) does not 
set forth a specific procedure for a receiver to follow in 
repudiating a contract.  Indeed, section 1821(e) leaves the 
decision as to whether repudiation is "burdensome" and "necessary 
to promote the orderly administration of the institution" to the 
receiver's discretion so long as repudiation is accomplished 
within "a reasonable period" following the receiver's 
appointment.  12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2). 
 Courts have refused to read into this statutory language any 
requirement for formal findings in support of a decision to 
repudiate.  In addressing this precise issue in a case involving 
a receiver's obligation to pay rent, the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit recently stated: 
 
  
 First, there is no requirement that the conservator or 
receiver make a formal finding that a lease or contract is 
burdensome.  Second, it can hardly be said that it was not 
reasonable for the [receiver] to find that it would be 
burdensome for it to assume a $7 million obligation to pay 
rent on premises for which it no longer had use, at a time 
when the real estate market was declining.  Third, whether 
the lease is burdensome is to be decided at the discretion 
of the conservator or receiver.  12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(1)(B). 
1185 Avenue of the Americas Assocs. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 22 
F.3d 494, 498 (2d Cir. 1994).  The court went on to uphold the 
district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of a receiver 
that claimed that it had repudiated a lease.  Id.; see also 
Morton, 836 F. Supp. at 485 ("The statute does not require that 
the receiver give reasons for repudiating a contract . . . . ");  
Jenkins-Petre Partnership One v. Resolution Trust Corp., No. 
Civ.A.91-A-637, 1991 WL 160317, at *5 (D. Col. Aug. 13, 1991) 
("The FIRREA statute does not provide that the [receiver] explain 
its actions or that a court may review the basis for that 
decision."). 
 We see no reason to depart from this line of cases.  The 
claimants have failed to demonstrate that the SPP, which provided 
no benefit to the receivership, but which called for millions of 
dollars in payments, should not be considered "burdensome."  In 
addition, we conclude that there is no basis in the statute or in 
the case law for requiring the FDIC, which has discretion in 
making the decision concerning whether to repudiate, to produce 
written findings. 
 Nor do we find merit in the Hennessy plaintiffs' argument 
that the FDIC's repudiation is invalid because it was carried out 
  
pursuant to an undisclosed policy.  We fail to comprehend how a 
consistent denial of the same type of claim constitutes an abuse 
of the FDIC's discretion.  If anything, such a longstanding 
policy demonstrates a conscious decision to promote uniform 
treatment of similar claims.  Accordingly, we cannot conclude 
that the district court erred in determining that the FDIC's 




 E. Actual Direct Compensatory Damages 
 The three sets of plaintiffs next argue that even if the 
FDIC did properly repudiate the SPP, they are entitled to 
severance benefits as actual direct compensatory damages under 12 
U.S.C. § 1821(e)(3).  The plaintiffs assert that severance pay in 
the context of at will employment represents additional 
compensation for entering into such a relationship and is 
therefore a compensable loss if not paid.  The plaintiffs rely on 
the decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit in Office and Professional Employees Int'l Union, Local 2 
v. FDIC, as Receiver of Nat'l Bank of Washington ("NBW"), 27 F.3d 
598 (D.C. Cir. 1994), to support their position. 
 While the question is close, we remain unconvinced by the 
plaintiffs' argument.  FIRREA provides, in pertinent part, that: 
 
 the liability of the conservator or receiver for the 
disaffirmance or repudiation of any contract pursuant to 
paragraph (1) shall be-- 
  (i) limited to actual direct compensatory damages; and 
  
  (ii) determined as of-- 
   (I) the date of the appointment of the conservator 
or receiver; . . . . 
12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(3)(A) (Supp. V 1993).  The statute states, 
however, that the term "actual direct compensatory damages" does 
not include: 
 
 (i) punitive or exemplary damages; 
 (ii) damages for lost profits or opportunity; or 
 (iii) damages for pain and suffering. 
12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(3)(B) (Supp. V 1993) (emphasis added).  The 
courts are split over the proper interpretation of these 
provisions.  The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has 
determined that the phrase "actual direct compensatory damages," 
does not include severance payments stipulated in advance.  
Howell v. FDIC, 986 F.2d 569, 573 (1st Cir. 1993).  According to 
that court, such payments are "at best an estimate of likely harm 
made at a time when only prediction is possible" and are 
analogous to "liquidated damages."  Id.  That court reasoned that 
because those employees entitled to severance pay "may, or may 
not, have suffered injury," depending on the employment options 
they had in the past and the options available now, and because 
"[c]onceivably," such employees could have suffered "no damage at 
all," severance payments of this type do not fit within the 
language of the statute.  Id.; see also Resolution Trust Corp. v. 
Management, Inc., 25 F.3d 627, 632 (8th Cir. 1994) ("Neither 
severance fees nor future lost profits are compensable under 
FIRREA."); Westport Bank & Trust Co. v. Geraghty, 865 F. Supp. 
83, 86 (D. Conn. 1994) ("Courts have found that damages resulting 
  
from the repudiation of a severance package are not `actual 
direct compensatory damages' within the meaning of § 1821 because 
they are analogous to liquidated damages."); Aguilar v. FDIC, No. 
92-4286 (RR), slip op. at 15-16 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 1993) (noting 
that courts have been unwilling to permit plaintiffs to recover 
amounts more akin to liquidated than compensatory damages); 
Lanigan v. Resolution Trust Corp., No. 91-7216, slip op. at 5-7 
(N.D. Ill. March 30, 1993) (relying on the reasoning in Howell). 
 As the plaintiffs point out, however, the Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit has taken a different view.  
In NBW, a case involving a collective bargaining agreement 
between the National Bank of Washington and its employees, the 
court of appeals determined that in the context of an at will 
employment relationship, severance payments are "properly 
characterized as consideration for entering into (or continuing 
under) the employment contract and therefore are compensable as 
actual damages under FIRREA."  NBW, 27 F.3d at 604.  Rejecting 
the "liquidated damages" analogy used by the Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit, the court determined that the FDIC was liable 
for severance payments.  Id. at 604-05. 
 In addition to being confronted with division amongst the 
courts, we must contend with competing policy considerations.  On 
the one hand, we have the concern raised in Howell that in 
drafting FIRREA, "Congress, faced with mountainous bank 
failures," was "determined to pare back damage claims founded on 
repudiated contracts."  Howell, 986 F.2d at 572.  On the other 
hand, we must address the point raised in NBW that the question 
  
is not whether Congress meant to scale back damage claims, but 
"which damage claims, however few, are preserved."  NBW, 27 F.3d 
at 604.  Moreover, we are cognizant of the fact that disallowance 
of promised severance pay may chill a troubled bank's ability to 
effectively retain able employees.  See Howell, 986 F.2d at 573. 
 We share the view of the Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit that these payments are analogous to "liquidated 
damages."  We therefore agree with the position of the district 
court in this case that these damages are not compensable as 
"actual direct compensatory damages" under 12 U.S.C. § 1821.9  
Accordingly, we will affirm the order of the district court 
granting summary judgment to the FDIC on the issue of separation 
pay. 
 
 IV. TERMINATION OF HEALTH AND LIFE INSURANCE BENEFITS 
 The Campbell and Adolph plaintiffs next allege that the 
district court erred in granting summary judgment against them on 
their claims for health and life insurance benefits pursuant to 
the 65 Special and the MGLIP.10  According to these plaintiffs, 
                     
9
.  In reaching this decision, we are not unmindful of the 
Hennessy plaintiffs' argument that under the terms of this 
severance pay plan, benefits are actually accelerated if the 
discharged employee finds other employment.  Hennessy App. at 106 
("If you are otherwise qualified for separation payments and then 
become employed during the benefit payment period . . . [y]ou 
will then receive a single-sum cash payment equal to the 
remaining separation pay to which you would have been entitled 
had you remained unemployed.").  Nevertheless, we believe that 
the function of these provisions is to articulate the timing of 
the payment of benefits rather than to relate the purpose behind 
the SPP.   
10
.  The Hennessy plaintiffs take no part in this argument. 
  
the district court erred in determining that the provisions of § 
402(b)(3) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(3), requiring that every 
employee benefit plan provide a "procedure for amending such 
plan," apply only to plan amendments and not to plan 
terminations.  These plaintiffs argue that because the FDIC did 
not follow the proper "procedure" in terminating their life and 
health insurance benefits, the FDIC should be responsible for 
these benefits until such time as the FDIC complies with ERISA.  
They suggest that a remand is appropriate to decide this 
question. 
 Relying on our previous decision in Schoonejongen v. 
Curtiss-Wright Corp., 18 F.3d 1034 (3d Cir. 1994), the district 
court held that when a party seeks to terminate an ERISA plan, 
there is no requirement that the ERISA plan have a termination 
procedure.  Campbell, 1994 WL 475067, at *5.  Subsequent to the 
district court's opinion in this matter, however, the Supreme 
Court reversed our panel's decision in Schoonejongen.  Curtiss-
Wright Corp v. Schoonejongen,     U.S.    , 115 S. Ct. 1223 
(1995).  Following that reversal, we decided the case of Ackerman 
v. Warnaco, Inc., No. 94-3527, 1995 WL 289682 (3d Cir. May 15, 
1995).  In that case, we explicitly held that § 402(b)(3) of 
ERISA applies to plan terminations as well as plan amendments.  
Ackerman, 1995 WL 289682, at *3.  Accordingly, we conclude that 
the district court erred in holding to the contrary. 
 Nevertheless, we cannot agree that a remand is appropriate 
or that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for 
the FDIC.  Section 402(b)(3) of ERISA requires that every 
  
employee benefit plan shall "provide a procedure for amending 
such plan, and for identifying the persons who have authority to 
amend the plan."  29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(3) (1988).  The summary 
plan booklet for the 65 Special states that: 
 
 Meritor intends the plan to be permanent, but since future 
conditions affecting your employment cannot be anticipated 
or foreseen, Meritor reserves the right to amend, modify or 
terminate the plan at any time, which may result in the 
termination or modification of your coverage. 
Campbell App. at 165a.  Similarly, the summary plan booklet for 
the MGLIP states: 
 
 Meritor reserves the right to terminate the group life 
insurance policy for its employees and retirees at any time, 
if Meritor determines that such termination is in its best 
interests.  If Meritor terminates its group life insurance 
policy, employees and retirees who die after the effective 
date of the termination (other than those who are totally 
disabled and insured under the provision of "Continuation of 
Life Insurance During Disability") will not have any life 
insurance. 
Campbell App. at 152a.  While section 402(b)(3) of ERISA requires 
that every employee benefit plan have a procedure for amending or 
terminating the plan, the Supreme Court has determined that 
language such as that stated above reserving the right of "the 
Company" to modify or amend a plan satisfies the requirements of 
section 402(b)(3).  Curtiss-Wright,     U.S. at    , 115 S. Ct. 
at 1228-29 ("Curtiss-Wright is correct, we think, that this 
states an amendment procedure and one that, like the 
identification procedure, is more substantial than might first 
appear.").  The Court explained that "the literal terms of § 
402(b)(3) are ultimately indifferent to the level of detail in an 
  
amendment procedure, or in an identification procedure for that 
matter."  Id. at    , 115 S. Ct. at 1229.  Further, the Court 
explained that "principles of corporate law provide a ready-made 
set of rules for determining, in whatever context, who has 
authority to make decisions on behalf of the company."  Id.  
Because the 65 Special and the MGLIP reserve to Meritor (the 
Company) the right to terminate these plans, we find no violation 
of the terms of section 402(b)(3). 
 The question therefore becomes what "procedure" the FDIC 
must follow when it is appointed receiver for Meritor and it 
terminates an employee welfare benefit plan pursuant to such a 
reservation clause.  Certainly, under such circumstances, it 
would make little sense to require the FDIC to follow Meritor's 
procedure for terminating these plans (i.e., calling a meeting of 
the Board of Directors of Meritor or taking other corporate 
action).  While the appropriate analog within the FDIC to 
Meritor's Board of Directors is not immediately apparent, it is 
clear that an official receiver has great discretion in taking 
action that would previously have been handled through the normal 
methods of corporate governance.  Thus, the receiver alone may 
act in ways that might otherwise require Board action.  The 
record reflects, and the plaintiffs concede, that on December 11, 
1992, "the FDIC" sent the Campbell and Adolph plaintiffs mailings 
notifying them of the termination of the 65 Special and the 
MGLIP.  Joint Statement of Undisputed And Disputed Facts 
Regarding Motions for Summary Judgment, Campbell App. at 416a-
17a; Joint Statement of Undisputed and Disputed Facts Regarding 
  
Motions for Summary Judgment, Adolph App. at 368a (incorporating 
statement of undisputed facts in Campbell case by reference).  
Since the plaintiffs acknowledged that they received notice of 
the plan terminations from "the FDIC," we decline to require 
further investigation into the methods by which the FDIC makes 
its decisions.  Accordingly, we will uphold the district court's 
grant of summary judgment for the FDIC on plaintiffs' claims for 
health and life insurance benefits. 
 
 V. STATUTORY PENALTY UNDER 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1) 
 The Campbell plaintiffs next allege that the district court 
erred in determining that the FDIC was not liable for the penalty 
found at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1) for failure to respond in a 
timely manner to a request for plan documents.  According to 
these plaintiffs, their counsel sent an ERISA document request to 
the FDIC as administrator of the Meritor Pension Plan and the 
Meritor Savings Bank Savings Plan on March 16, 1993.  The FDIC 
did not respond until September 21, 1993, 189 days after the 
initial request.  Because ERISA provides that the plan 
administrator must mail requested material within 30 days of such 
a request, the Campbell plaintiffs assert that they are entitled 
to the requisite statutory penalty of up to $100.00 a day for 
each day the plan administrator failed to comply. 
 We cannot agree.  ERISA provides that an administrator who 




 may in the court's discretion be personally liable to such 
participant or beneficiary in the amount of up to $100 a day 
from the date of such failure or refusal, and the court may 
in its discretion order such other relief as it deems 
proper. 
29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1993) (emphasis added).  The 
district court in this case made two alternative findings.  
First, it determined that while by its terms ERISA's requirements 
and penalties apply to all administrators, "the requirement 
should not apply to the FDIC since it is an agency of the federal 
government."  Campbell, 1994 WL 475067, at *7.  Second, it 
determined that even if the statutory penalty for failure to 
provide requested information in a timely manner is applicable to 
the FDIC, "the court shall exercise its discretion under 29 
U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1) and award no penalty in this case."  Id.  The 
court explained that any penalty applied "would be an 
unjustifiable windfall to the plaintiffs and would hinder the 
FDIC in achieving its public mission -- the orderly wrapping up 
of Meritor's affairs."  Id. 
 As the district court noted, the issue of whether the 
penalty provision of § 1132(c)(1) applies to the FDIC when it 
acts as receiver for a failed financial institution is one of 
first impression.  Id. at *6.  We agree that nothing on the face 
of § 1132(c) exempts the FDIC from the requirement of furnishing 
requested documents in a timely manner.  We therefore see no 
reason to adopt a rule categorically excluding the FDIC from this 
important ERISA obligation.  The reasoning of the district court, 
that the requirement should not apply to the FDIC since it is an 
  
agency of the federal government, is unconvincing.  Employees' 
need for access to significant information about plan coverage 
does not diminish because the entity currently in charge of the 
plan is an agency of the federal government.11    
 Concerning the district court's alternative holding, 
however, we have previously determined that whether a district 
court awards a plaintiff monetary damages under 29 U.S.C. § 
1132(c)(1) is a matter of discretion.  Gillis v. Hoechst Celanese 
Corp., 4 F.3d 1137, 1148 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied,     U.S.     
, 114 S. Ct. 1369 (1994).  Since the district court did determine 
that any penalty in this case would be an "unjustifiable 
windfall" and "would hinder" the FDIC in "the orderly wrapping up 
of Meritor's affairs," we cannot conclude that the district court 
abused its discretion in declining to award a statutory penalty.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the order of the district court 
denying the Campbell plaintiffs a § 1132(c)(1) penalty award. 
 
 VI.  CLASS ACTION ISSUES 
 The Campbell plaintiffs also raise a number of issues 
concerning the district court's decision to deny certification of 
three plaintiff classes.  The district court determined that the 
plaintiffs failed to establish the threshold requirements under 
                     
11
.  The FDIC suggests that 12 U.S.C. § 1825(b)(3), a FIRREA 
provision, creates an exemption from the ERISA penalty 
requirement.  That provision states that the FDIC, when acting as 
receiver, "shall not be liable for any amounts in the nature of 
penalties or fines." 12 U.S.C. § 1825(b)(3).  Read as a whole, 
however, § 1825 appears to concern exemptions from taxes.  We 
therefore find this argument unconvincing.      
  
Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Campbell, 
No. 93-3969, at 5, 7, 9 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 1994) (order denying 
class certification).  In addition, the district court found that 
class certification under Rule 23(b)(1) or Rule 23(b)(2) would be 
inappropriate.  Id. at 9.  Because of our decision on the merits 
of the Campbell plaintiffs' claims, that these claims cannot 
survive summary judgment, we need not address the propriety of 
the district court's decision to deny class certification.  We 
therefore take no position with respect to these issues. 
 
 VII. CONCLUSION 
 The district court did not err in granting summary judgment 
to the FDIC on the plaintiffs' claims for separation pay, health 
insurance benefits, and life insurance benefits.  We will 
therefore affirm the orders of the district court.  Further, 
because the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
declining to find the FDIC liable for the statutory penalty 
prescribed by 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1), we will affirm the order of 
the district court pertaining to this issue.  Finally, because of 
our conclusion on the merits of the Campbell plaintiffs' claims, 
that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment 
for the FDIC, we do not reach the class certification issues. 
 Each party to bear its own costs. 
                
